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Social Interactions and Smoking
David M. Cutler and Edward L. Glaeser
5.1    Introduction
A large and growing literature suggests that individual choices are inﬂ  u-
enced by the choices of their friends and neighbors. These peer eﬀects have 
been found in dropping out, unemployment, crime, pregnancy, and many 
other settings (Crane 1991; Case and Katz 1991; Glaeser Sacerdote, and 
Scheinkman 1996; Topa 2001; Brock and Durlauf 2001; Kuziemko 2006). 
The older work in this literature was criticized because the company you 
keep is rarely random (Manski 1993). Newer work in this area has docu-
mented peer eﬀects in settings where there is real random assignment, such 
as college dormitories (Sacerdote 2001).
There are many reasons to think that peers matter for health-  related 
behaviors. In many cases, health-  related behaviors are more fun to do when 
others are doing them too (drinking, for example). Peers are also a source of 
information (the beneﬁ  ts of a mammogram) or about what is acceptable in 
society (the approbation accorded smokers). A recent study suggested that 
a good part of the obesity “epidemic” in the United States is spread from 
person to person, in a manner reminiscent of viral infections (Christakis 
and Fowler 2007).
These interpersonal complementarities can have enormous social impact. 
In addition to helping us understand how health behaviors operate, they 
magnify the impact of policy interventions. The existence of social inter-
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actions implies that a policy intervention has both a direct eﬀect on the 
impacted individual and an indirect, as that person’s behavior impacts 
everyone around. These indirect eﬀects create a social multiplier where the 
predicted impact of interventions will be greater when the interventions 
occur at large geographic levels than when they occur individually (Glaeser, 
Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 2003). The social multiplier also suggests that 
parameter estimates from aggregate regressions can mislead us about indi-
vidual level parameters.
In this chapter, we assess the evidence on social interactions in one par-
ticularly important health- related behavior: smoking. There are a number of 
reasons we might expect to see social interactions in smoking, as we discuss 
in section 5.2. These include direct social interactions (where one person’s 
utility is aﬀected by whether others are doing the same thing); the social 
formation of beliefs; and supply-  side interactions from market creation in 
a situation in ﬁ  xed costs.
Section 5.3 lays out the empirical implications of social interactions. The 
most straightforward implication of social interactions is that an exogenous 
variable that increases the costs of a behavior for one person will decrease 
the prevalence of that behavior is his or her peers. Social interactions mod-
els also predict excess variance in smoking rates across aggregates. Finally, 
the existence of social interactions implies that the measured impact of 
an exogenous variable on an outcome becomes larger at higher levels of 
aggregation.
In sections 5.3 and 5.4, we look at these three empirical predictions. At 
the individual level, we examine the impact of workplace smoking bans 
on spousal smoking. Evans, Farrelly, and Montgomery (1999) show that 
workplace bans have a signiﬁ  cant impact on the probability that an indi-
vidual will smoke and that these bans survive various estimation strategies 
that address selection of smokers into smoke-  friendly workplaces. We look 
at whether people are more likely to smoke if their spouse smokes, using 
workplace smoking bans as an instrument for spousal smoking. The inde-
pendent variable (IV) estimate is large: we estimate that an individual whose 
spouse smokes is 40 percent more likely to smoke. The instrumental variables 
estimate is higher for men than for women, suggesting that men are more 
inﬂ  uenced by spousal smoking. These eﬀects are also stronger for people 
with some college than for people with college degrees or people who were 
high school dropouts.
In section 5.5, we turn to the other empirical implications of social inter-
actions. We ﬁ  rst show that the impact of smoking bans appears to be greater 
at the area level than at the individual level. At an individual level, a work-
place ban reduces the probability of smoking by about 5 percent. At the 
metropolitan area level, a 10 percent increase in the share of workers facing 
workplace bans reduces the share of people who smoke by more than 3 
percent—six times greater than the .5 percent predicted by the individual 
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We also examine the prediction that social interactions create excess vari-
ance of aggregate smoking rates. We ﬁ  nd that the standard deviation of 
smoking rates across metropolitan areas or states are about seven times 
higher than the rates that would be predicted if there were no social interac-
tions and if there were no exogenous variables that diﬀered across space. 
Since there are signiﬁ  cant exogenous variables that diﬀer across space, we do 
not put complete stock in these numbers. Still, these high variances provide 
evidence supporting the existence of social interactions in smoking.
Section 5.6 turns to the question of whether social interactions can help 
us make sense of the time series of smoking. Social interactions predict 
s-  shaped adoption curves and changes are a function of current levels of 
smoking. A simple regression suggests that social interactions are not obvi-
ous in the national dynamics of cigarette prevalence, but our samples for 
this regression are small. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2      Sources of Social Interactions
Why should one person’s smoking increase his neighbor’s tendency to 
smoke? There are three broad categories of reasons for such social interac-
tions: (a) direct social interactions, including social approval and stigma; 
(b) the social formation of beliefs, and (c) market-  mediated spillovers that 
occur because of ﬁ  xed costs in the provision of healthy or unhealthy behav-
ior. In this section, we brieﬂ  y review these three possible reasons for interper-
sonal complementarities in smoking and other health-  related behaviors.
The ﬁ  rst reason that one person’s smoking, or eating or exercise, might 
positively inﬂ  uence a neighbor’s choices is that it is more pleasant to do 
something together than alone. This is most obvious in the context of eat-
ing, where it is more pleasurable (most of the time) to eat with others rather 
than eating alone. Because of the desire to eat together, people are more 
likely to go to donut shops, steak houses, or McDonald’s, if their friends are 
also doing so. Drinking is also a social activity; if one’s friends like to drink 
in bars, the returns from going to bars rises. Smoking and exercise may be 
somewhat less social activities, but many people like to exercise or smoke 
with friends around.
Conversely, smoking around a nonsmoker can be much less pleasant be-
cause of the discomfort caused by secondhand smoke to a nonsmoker. While 
there may be debate about the health consequences of secondhand smoke, 
there is less disagreement about whether nonsmokers dislike smoke. If a 
smoker has some degree of altruism for the uncomfortable nonsmoker, or if 
the nonsmoker chooses to reciprocate his discomfort by scolding the smoker, 
then this will decrease the returns to smoking around non  smokers.
A second reason for social interactions in health behaviors is that beliefs 
may themselves be formed through social learning. One type of social learn-
ing model suggests that people infer truth from the behavior of others (e.g., 
Ellison and Fudenberg 1993). A person may not know whether moderate 126        David M. Cutler and Edward L. Glaeser
drinking is good or bad, but they can get guidance on this by watching others 
they believe have more information. In these models, the presence of friends 
and neighbors who smoke, drink, or exercise will provide evidence about the 
beneﬁ  ts of these activities. Conversely, the absence of smoking will be taken 
to mean that there is something wrong with lighting up.
Of course, conversation also transmits information (e.g., DeMarzo, Vaya-
nos, and Zweibel 2003). If smoking, or any other harmful activity, increases 
one’s belief in the net beneﬁ  ts of that activity—perhaps because of cognitive 
dissonance—then smokers are likely to articulate the view that cigarettes are 
pleasurable or not harmful. These views will then be transmitted in conver-
sation and perhaps persuade some peers that smoking is less harmful. The 
power of these views will depend, of course, on the extent to which other 
messages about the beneﬁ  ts or harms of the activity are being regularly 
broadcast.
The third reason for social interactions works through the market. The 
typical assumption about markets is that supply curves slope up: when more 
people consume a good, the price of that good rises. This creates a negative 
social interaction; more people smoking will drive up the price of cigarettes, 
and discourage some marginal smokers from smoking. However, as George 
and Waldfogel (2003, 2006) have recently emphasized, in the presence of 
ﬁ  xed costs these negative market-  based social interactions can be reversed. 
Suppliers are only likely to pay the ﬁ  xed costs to set up if the market size 
is suﬃciently high. In that case, the market creates a strong positive social 
interaction.
This market- based interpersonal complementarity is more likely in goods 
with ﬁ  xed costs, such as restaurants, grocery stores, bars, or health clubs. 
Cigarettes production itself has large ﬁ  xed costs, but since transport costs 
are low, cigarette availability does not depend on local market size. However, 
several studies have shown that healthy foods are hard to buy in low income 
areas, presumably because of limited demand. The presence of health clubs 
and bars also depend on the presence of sizable local demand.
The relative importance of these diﬀerent types of social interactions will 
diﬀer across behaviors. Direct interactions and belief formation seem more 
important for smoking. Market-  based interactions are more likely to be 
important for exercise and consumption of healthy food. In the next section, 
we will not distinguish between these diﬀerent sources of social interac-
tions but discuss more generally the empirical implications of interpersonal 
complementarities in health-  related behaviors.
5.3      Empirical Tests of Social Interactions
The literature on social interactions has broadly identiﬁ  ed four diﬀerent 
empirical implications of social interactions. First, social interactions imply 
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also undertaking that activity. Second, the existence of social interactions 
implies a social multiplier, where the impact of some exogenous character-
istic on the outcome at an individual level is much smaller than the impact 
of that same characteristic on the outcome at an aggregate level. Third, 
social interactions imply high levels of variance in the activity across space 
(Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 1996). Fourth, in a dynamic setting, 
social interactions lead to an S-  shaped adoption curve. In this section, we 
present a particularly simple social interaction model that illustrates the ﬁ  rst 
three points. In section 5.6, we discuss a dynamic model.
We start with a simple model of social interactions. We assume that in-
dividual i receives private beneﬁ  ts from an activity, Xi, of AiXi, where Ai 
diﬀers across individuals. The cost of the activity is .5X2. To capture so-
cial interactions, we assume that beneﬁ  ts increase by b times that average 
consumption of X among person i’s friends, which we denote X ˆ
i. The utility 
of individual i is therefore (Ai   bX ˆ
i)Xi  –   Xi
2. When individuals set marginal 
beneﬁ  ts equal to marginal costs, the optimal level of X will satisfy Xi   
Ai   bX ˆ
i.
Aggregating this relationship implies that X ˆ
i   A ˆ
i/ (1  –   b), where A ˆ
i refers 
to the average value of A in i’s peer group. Substituting this term in implies 
that individual X will equal Ai   bA ˆ
i/ (1 –  b). If b is greater than 1/ 2, then the 
impact of average “A” is greater than the impact of individual “A”.
These calculations deliver the basic empirical implications of social inter-
actions models. First, there will be greater variation in the outcome across 
space than would be predicted based on individual diﬀerences alone. Within 
groups, the variance of the outcome will be Var(Ai) while the variance of 
outcomes across groups will equal Var(A ˆ
i)/ (1  –   b)2. If there are N people in 
each group who are allocated randomly, then Var(A ˆ
i)   Var(Ai)/  N, so in 
that case, the ratio of the aggregate variance to the individual within group 
variance should equal 1/  [N(1 –   b)2]. High group level variance is a sign that 
“b” is high.1
While we implement this test, we note one obvious diﬃculty with it: 
the ratio of across to within group variance is likely to be biased upwards 
because of omitted characteristics that diﬀer at the group level. For example, 
if exogenous tastes for smoking diﬀer across areas and we cannot control for 
tastes, we will attribute the variation in smoking rates across areas to social 
spillovers rather than tastes. One method of dealing with this problem is to 
control extensively for observable characteristics and then to assume that 
the heterogeneity across groups in the unobservable characteristics is some 
multiple of the heterogeneity across groups in observable characteristics.
A second implication of the model is the existence of a social multiplier. 
1. We conduct our test using standard deviations: the ratio of the standard deviation at the 
group level, to the standard deviation at the individual level divided by the square root of N is 
an estimate of 1/  (1 –   b).128        David M. Cutler and Edward L. Glaeser
To see this, assume that Ai   ai    zi where   is a constant and zi is an exog-
enous characteristic such as income or public policy regulations. In this 
case, regressing the outcome on z at the individual level will give a coeﬃcient 
of  , while the same regression at the aggregate level will give a coeﬃcient of 
  / (1  –   b). Thus, the group level relationship will be stronger than individual 
relationship, which is the deﬁ  nition of a social multiplier.
The most common empirical approach to social interactions has been at 
the individual level, estimating a regression of one person’s outcomes on the 
outcomes of a neighbor. The reﬂ  ection problem (Manski 1993) means that a 
direct regression of this sort does not recover the parameter b. For example, 
assume a peer group of two people, i and j. Then, person i’s outcome is 
Ai   bXj and person j’s outcome is Aj   bXj. Solving these two equations 
implies that person i’s outcome equals (Ai   bAj)/ (1  –   b2) and person j’s 
outcome equals (Aj   bAi)/ (1  –   b2). Straightforward analysis shows that a 
univariate regression where person i’s outcome is regressed on person j’s 
outcome does not yield the parameter b, but rather 2b/ (1    b2).
External factors can help us with this problem, however. Speciﬁ  cally, if 
Ai   ai    zi and zj is used as an instrument for Aj then the instrumental 
variables estimate of the social interaction (Cov(Ai,zj)/ Cov(Aj,zj)) will equal 
b. We will follow this approach in our analysis.
5.4      Social Interactions in Smoking: Direct Tests
Surely a spouse is among the most important of all social inﬂ  uences. 
For all of the reasons previously discussed, we would expect the inﬂ  uence 
of behaviors to be particularly large within a family. In addition, smok-
ing might be sensitive to peers or other people similarly situated. In this 
section, we look at the inﬂ  uence of one spouse’s smoking decisions on the 
smoking propensity of the other spouse. We also look at the inﬂ  uence of 
smoking rates for people with similar demographic characteristics. Clearly 
the decision of two married people or friends to smoke is endogenous. To 
address the endogeneity issues just discussed, we follow Evans, Farrelly, 
and Montgomery (1999) and use the presence of workplace smoking bans 
as an instrument for the smoking of one spouse.
We use the Current Population Survey (CPS) tobacco supplement data 
for information on smoking rates and workplace smoking bans. The CPS 
asks about smoking and smoking bans in four periods: 1992 and 1993, 1995, 
1998, and 2002. We sample people between the ages of ﬁ  fteen and sixty- four. 
The smoking data is asked of everyone. The smoking ban question is asked 
only of indoor workers. We discuss this more in the following.
Table 5.1 shows the means and standard deviations from this data source. 
Between 1992 and 2002, the overall smoking rate declined from 25 percent 
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are those eﬀected by smoking bans, was similar: 24 percent in 1992 and 1993 
to 20 percent in 2002.
Smoking bans for indoor workers were spreading rapidly in the 1990s. 
While the overall share of the sample with a smoking ban increases from 
35 percent in 1992 and 1993 to 45 percent in 2002, the share of the indoor 
workers with smoking bans increased from 66 percent in 1992 and 1993 to 
79 percent ten years later. The current omnipresence of workplace bans 
represents a remarkable change over twenty-  ﬁ  ve years. Evans, Farrelly, and 
Montgomery (1999) report that as late as 1985, only one-  quarter of work-
places banned smoking.
As Evans, Farrelly, and Montgomery (1999) discuss, the estimated impact 
of smoking bans on smoking may be biased because of sorting across jobs. 
Smokers may choose jobs that are particularly smoke- friendly, and this will 
cause a negative correlation between workplace bans and smoking that does 
not reﬂ  ect the impact of the bans. Their own instrumentation strategy sug-
gests that this selection (within indoor jobs) is relatively weak. We have no 
comparable sources of exogenous variation. As such, we will look at the 
impact of workplace bans directly without using instruments.
We start by looking at the impact of smoking bans on the smoking rates 
of people aﬀected by them. To do this, we estimate a model of smoking rates 
as a function of demographics and the presence of a smoking ban:
(1) Smokei    0    1 · Smoking Bani   Zi    εi,
where i denotes individuals and Z is the control variables. We include a 
number of standard controls: age and its square, gender, family size, fam-
ily income, a dummy for missing income, education (   high school, high 
school, some college, college grad,   college), race/  ethnicity (white, black, 
Hispanic, other race), marital status (married, divorced, separated, wid-
owed, never married), industry dummies, occupation dummies, a dummy 
for whether the person is employed, and a dummy for whether the person 
is an indoor worker. We also control for metropolitan area and year ﬁ  xed 
eﬀects so that our results reﬂ  ect changes in smoking bans within regions 
over time.
Table 5.1  Trends in smoking rates and smoking bans (%)
Measure   1992–1993  1995  1998  2002
Smoking rate, overall 25 25 24 20
Smoking rate, indoor workers 24 24 23 20
Percent with smoking ban, overall 35 42 44 45
Percent with smoking ban, indoor workers   66   75   78   79
Note: The sample is self-  respondents aged ﬁ  fteen to sixty-  four from the Current Population 
Survey. Data are weighted using sample weights.130        David M. Cutler and Edward L. Glaeser
The ﬁ  rst column in table 5.2 shows our basis results. Since the dependent 
variable is dichotomous, we report marginal eﬀects from a Probit regression. 
We estimate that workers who face workplace smoking bans are 4.6 percent 
less likely to be smokers. The coeﬃcient is highly statistically signiﬁ  cant. The 
magnitude here is similar to that found in Evans, Farrelly, and Montgomery 
(1999), who estimated that smoking bans reduce workplace smoking by 5 
percent.
We are less concerned with the other variables, but some are worthy of 
note. Surprisingly, we do not ﬁ  nd a signiﬁ  cant eﬀect of cigarette taxes on 
smoking. The coeﬃcient is negative, as expected, but not statistically signiﬁ  -
cant. It may be that by the late 1990s, the most price sensitive smokers have 
already left the market. More education is negatively related to smoking, 
with large coeﬃcients. College graduates are 15 percent less likely to smoke 
than high school graduates. Blacks and Hispanics are less likely to smoke 
than are whites, and employed people smoke less.
We now turn to the models including spillovers. In regression (2), we show 
the ordinary least squares regression when individual smoking is regressed 
on all of the variables in the ﬁ  rst regression and on an indicator variable for 
whether the spouse smokes.2 The regression shows that people whose spouse 
smokes are 21 percent more likely to smoke themselves. We would normally 
expect this coeﬃcient to be biased upwards both because of the endogeneity 
of spousal smoking and because of selection of spouses.
Regression (3) looks at the spillovers of smoking in a more general peer 
group. As is common in the literature, we deﬁ  ne the peer group as people in 
the same metropolitan area and cohort group within the same metropolitan 
area and with the same age (fourteen to thirty, thirty-  one to ﬁ  fty, and ﬁ  fty-
  one to sixty-  four) and education level (   high school, high school, come 
college, college graduate). There is a very high correlation of smoking rates 
across people in a common reference group. The coeﬃcient on reference 
group smoking is 0.8, which means that as the share of peers that smokes 
increases by 10 percent, the probability that an individual will himself smoke 
increases by 8 percent. As in the case of the spousal smoking coeﬃcient, 
we expect this coeﬃcient to be biased upwards because individuals inﬂ  u-
ence their peers and because of omitted variables that are correlated across 
peers.
The obvious solution in each case is instrumental variables. In the case of 
spousal smoking, we instrument with whether the spouse has a smoking ban 
at work. In the case of peer group smoking, we instrument with the share 
of the peer group that has a smoking ban at work. Regressions (4) and (5) 
show these results—the former for spousal smoking only, and the latter for 
spousal and reference group smoking.
2. Since this is a prelude to the instrumental variables estimates, we also include dummies for 
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Table 5.2  Explaining smoking decisions
Individual 
ban only With peer eﬀects
OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Independent variable   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)
Smoking
  Smoking  ban –0.046 –0.043 –0.042 –0.041 –0.041
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗
  Spouse  smokes — 0.211 0.180 0.401 0.400
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.082)∗∗∗ (0.084)∗∗∗
  Reference  group  — — 0.880 — 0.050
  smoking  rate (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.285)
  Cigarette  tax –0.005 –0.006 0.006 –0.006 –0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Demographics
  Age 0.025 0.024 0.013 0.023 0.023
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
  Age2 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0002 –0.0003 –0.0003
(9.4E- 6)∗∗∗ (1.1E- 5)∗∗∗ (1.1E- 5)∗∗∗ (1.2E- 5)∗∗∗ (4.5E- 5)∗∗∗
  Female –0.036 –0.04 –0.039 –0.044 –0.044
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
  Family  size –0.018 –0.017 –0.016 –0.017 –0.017
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗
  Ln(family  inc) –0.047 –0.044 –0.038 –0.041 –0.041
(0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗∗ (0.003)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗
  Income  missing –0.524 –0.487 –0.421 –0.458 –0.455
(0.024)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗∗ (0.030)∗∗∗ (0.038)∗∗∗
    High school 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.014
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗
  Some  college –0.05 –0.045 0.015 –0.041 –0.036
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.020)
  College  grad –0.148 –0.137 0.034 –0.127 –0.114
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.056)∗∗
    College –0.17 –0.156 0.014 –0.143 –0.13
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.055)∗∗
  Black –0.078 –0.073 –0.067 –0.069 –0.069
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗
  Hispanic –0.13 –0.122 –0.096 –0.116 –0.114
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
  Other  race –0.056 –0.052 –0.051 –0.049 –0.049
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗
  Divorced 0.098 0.125 0.113 0.154 0.153
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗
  Separated 0.108 0.135 0.122 0.165 0.164
(0.010)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗∗
  Widowed 0.066 0.093 0.083 0.122 0.122
(0.010)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.016)∗∗∗ (0.017)∗∗∗
  Never  married 0.03 0.055 0.048 0.082 0.082
(0.004)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗
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The instrumentation has very diﬀerent eﬀects on the estimated spouse 
and reference group coeﬃcients. When we instrument using smoking bans 
facing one’s spouse, we ﬁ  nd that the estimated impact of spousal smoking 
increases to .4, so that people whose spouses smoke are 40 percent more 
likely to smoke themselves. While the magnitude of this coeﬃcient is not 
unreasonable, we are somewhat skeptical about the fact that the estimated 
coeﬃcient rises. One interpretation of this might be that we are not mea-
suring the intensity of spousal smoking, and working in a place without a 
ban might be particularly correlated with intensive smoking. An alternative 
interpretation is that spouse’s workplace smoking bans are correlated with 
other characteristics, like the prosmoking atmosphere in one’s social group, 
that we cannot adequately control for.
  Employed –0.074 –0.071 –0.059 –0.068 –0.068
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
  Indoor  worker 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.036
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.006)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗
  Spouse  employed — –0.009 –0.008 –0.012 –0.012
(0.005)∗∗ (0.004) (0.005)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗
  Spouse  indoor  worker — –0.009 –0.005 –0.014 –0.014
(0.004)∗∗ (0.003) (0.004)∗∗∗ (0.005)∗∗∗
  Percent  reference  group  — — –0.074 — 0.004
  employed (0.013)∗∗∗ (0.030)
  Percent  reference  group  — — –0.03 — –0.031
  indoor  worker (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.012)∗∗
  MSA  dummy  variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
  Year  dummy  variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 195,579 195,579 195,579 195,579 195,579
R2   0.10   0.11   0.17   0.10   0.11
Notes: Data are from CPS Sept. 1992/May 1993, Sept. 1995, Sept. 1998, and Feb. 2002 Tobacco Supple-
ment Surveys. Sample composition is of people aged ﬁ  fteen to sixty-  four. All regressions also include 
major industry (twenty- one dummies) and major occupation (thirteen dummies) eﬀects, and are weighted 
by the self- response supplement sample weight. Models for individuals and spouses are clustered by fam-
ily id. Models including cohort eﬀects are clustered by the MSA cohort education level with cohort ages 
of fourteen to thirty, thirty-  one to ﬁ  fty, and ﬁ  fty-  one to sixty-  four and education levels of less than high 
school, high school, some college, and college graduates or higher. Spouse smokes instrumented by 
spouse smoking ban, and reference group smoking rate instrumented by share of reference group with a 
smoking ban. OLS   ordinary least squares; IV   independent variable. Dashed Cells   not included in 
regression.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
Table 5.2  (continued)
Individual 
ban only With peer eﬀects
OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Independent variable   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)Social Interactions and Smoking    1 3 3
In regression (5), we see that the instrumental variables approach com-
pletely eliminates the estimated impact of peer smoking on an individu-
al’s decision to smoke. While the standard error is large (29 percent), the 
coeﬃcient is very small (5 percent). The coeﬃcient on spousal smoking, 
in contrast, is essentially unchanged. One interpretation of these results is 
that spousal smoking does have spillovers, but peer group smoking does 
not. Another view is that our instrumental variables peer group coeﬃcient 
is not precisely estimated enough to really say much about the impact of 
peers on smoking.
One question commonly speculated about is how spillovers diﬀer by 
demographic group. One often hears that less educated groups might be 
more responsive to peer inﬂ  uences, though information dissemination is 
perhaps greater in better educated groups. In table 5.3, we estimate the spill-
over eﬀects separately for diﬀerent population subgroups. The regressions 
are all similar to those in table 5.2, though we only report the coeﬃcients on 








smoking rate   N   R2
All –0.041 0.400 0.050 195,579 0.11
(0.005)∗∗∗ (0.084)∗∗∗ (0.285)
By gender
  Men –0.052 0.502 –0.002 86,321 0.1
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.196)∗∗ (0.416)
  Women –0.029 0.365 –0.264 109,258 0.04
(0.006)∗∗∗ (0.073)∗∗∗ (0.628)
By education
    High school –0.033 –0.0080 –0.054 29,392 0.18
(0.014)∗∗ (0.525) (2.235)
  High  school –0.050 0.289 –3.198 61,744 —
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.261) (5.203)
  Some  college –0.042 0.663 –0.269 52,175 —
(0.011)∗∗∗ (0.177)∗∗∗ (0.668)
  College    –0.020 0.346 1.201 52,268 0.07
    (0.008)∗∗∗   (0.191)   (1.148)        
Notes: The reference group is based on the MSA cohort education level. All regressions in-
clude age, age squared, family size, log(family income), missing income dummy, three indica-
tors for ethnicity, four indicators for marital status, cigarette tax (state   federal), twenty-  one 
industry indicators, and thirteen occupation indicators. Regression for all, men, and women 
also include four indicators for educational attainment. Regressions for all and education bins 
include indicator for gender. Spouse smokes instrumented by spouse smoking ban, and refer-
ence group smoking rate instrumented by share of reference group with a smoking ban. Re-
gressions weighted by self-  response supplement weight.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.134        David M. Cutler and Edward L. Glaeser
workplace bans, spousal smoking, and peer group smoking. The ﬁ  rst row in 
the table reports our benchmark results from column (5) of table 5.2.
The next two rows report these results separately for men and women. 
Workplace smoking bans have a larger impact on men (5.2 percent) than 
on women (2.9 percent). This may be because men are more likely to work 
full time, or because men infer more from a workplace smoking ban than do 
women. Men are also more sensitive to spousal smoking than are women. 
The coeﬃcient on (instrumented) spousal smoking is 0.50 for men and 0.37 
for women. According to these ﬁ  ndings, wives have a bigger impact on hus-
bands than husbands have on wives. The reference group smoking rate is 
insigniﬁ  cant for both genders.
The next four rows show the results for four separate education groups: 
high school dropouts, high school graduates with no college, people with 
some college education, and people with college degrees. The impact on 
workplace bans is strongest for those individuals in the middle education 
categories. The impact of spousal smoking is strongest for people with some 
college and weakest for people who are high school dropouts. The reference 
group eﬀects diﬀer substantially across education subgroups but are never 
statistically signiﬁ  cant.
Overall, these ﬁ  ndings support the idea of a substantial social interac-
tion in smoking between spouses. While we are not conﬁ  dent that the right 
coeﬃcient is .4, rather than .2, we are reassured by the fact that the positive 
social spillover is robust to our instrumental variables strategy. The refer-
ence group may also be important, but the fact that it is not robust to our 
instrumental variables strategy makes us less conﬁ  dent about its strength.
5.5      Social Multipliers and Excess Variance in Smoking
We now turn to other evidence for social spillovers in smoking: variability 
across groups and social multipliers. We start with nonparametric evidence: 
the variability in smoking rates across groups. At the individual, our esti-
mated smoking rate of 24 percent implies a standard deviation of .43. If 
there were no omitted variables across metropolitan areas and if there were 
no social interactions, then this variance should decline substantially with 
group size. Speciﬁ  cally, the standard deviation of smoking rates across a 
group of size N should equal .42/  N .
Our metropolitan area samples have, on average, 3,238 individuals, which 
implies that the standard deviation of smoking rates across groups should 
equal approximately .008. As table 5.4 shows, this is approximately one-
  sixth of the actual variation in smoking rates across our metropolitan area 
samples. At the state level, our average sample size is 10,684, which implies 
that the standard deviation of smoking rates across state groups should 
equal approximately .004. Again, the actual standard deviation is almost 
seven times larger than this amount.Social Interactions and Smoking    1 3 5
Using the calculations in section 5.2, an aggregate to individual standard 
deviation of 6 suggests a value of b of .83. Surely, this estimate is biased 
upwards because of omitted group level characteristics. Nonetheless, there 
is a high level of variation at the group level, which supports the idea that 
social interactions may be important in smoking.
A third test for social multipliers is to look at the impact of external 
factors on smoking rates at the individual and group level. As section 5.2 
pointed out, in a situation of social multipliers, the aggregate impact of a 
particular factor will be greater than the individual impact. We test this using 
the individual, metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and state- level samples. 
The basic approach of these regressions is to regress smoking on the same 
characteristics at the individual, metropolitan area and state level. If social 
interactions are important then we should expect the impact of character-
istics to become more important at higher levels of aggregation (Glaeser, 
Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 2003).
In principle, a social multiplier could show up in any variable, but we 
would be less inclined to see it in variables that are strongly correlated with 
social groupings. For example, even though age is correlated with smoking, 
we might not expect to ﬁ  nd a large social multiplier in age, because people of 
similar age groups tend to sort together. Thus, the presence of a large number 
of young smokers in a particular locale would not have a large impact on 
the smoking habits of older people. With this in mind, we focus most heavily 
on our key variable—the presence of smoking bans—and look at whether 
the impact of this variable increases at higher levels of aggregation. We also 
look at the spillovers associated with years of education, income, and basic 
demographics (age and gender).
Table 5.5 shows the results of this estimation. The ﬁ  rst column of table 
5.5 shows our basic individual level speciﬁ  cation. The coeﬃcient is similar 
to table 5.2, though slightly larger, reﬂ  ecting the restriction to 2001 and the 
compression of education into a single variable. The second and third col-
umns repeat this speciﬁ  cation at the metropolitan area level and the state 
level. The coeﬃcient on the smoking ban variable increases across columns. 
Table 5.4  The variability of smoking across areas
   
Average 
observations 
per unit  
Predicted 





Individual 1 0.427 0.427 —
MSA 3,238 0.008 0.046 6.1
State   10,684   0.004   0.027   6.5
Note: The sample is self-  respondents aged ﬁ  fteen to sixty-  four from the Current Population 
Survey. Data are weighted using sample weights. Dashed cell   ratio not appropriate.136        David M. Cutler and Edward L. Glaeser
The individual coeﬃcient of –  .061 increases to –  .257 at the metropolitan 
area level and –  .713 at the state level.
A social multiplier of four at the metropolitan area level and twelve at the 
state level gives us another estimate of 1/  (1 –   b), which is again compatible 
with an estimate of “b” ranging from .75 to .9. Of course, just as the variance 
estimates can potentially be biased by omitted area level characteristics, the 
social multiplier numbers are also likely to be biased upwards. Nonetheless, 
this provides suggestive support for signiﬁ  cant social interactions in the 
smoking.
Perhaps the other two most natural candidates for variables in which to 
look for social multipliers are income and education. The years of education 
measure shows essentially no social multiplier. The logarithm of income 
shows a much stronger social multiplier of three at the metropolitan level 
and ﬁ  ve at the state level. Again, this is compatible with high levels of social 
interactions, between .67 and .8.
Table 5.6 looks at these social multipliers within education categories. In 
this case, we just look at the social multiplier on the smoking ban variable. 
We ﬁ nd the largest social multipliers for high school graduates and the small-
est for college graduates. In these regressions, social inﬂ  uence in smoking is 
more important for less educated people.
Table 5.5  The spillover eﬀects of smoking
Independent Variable   Individual   MSA   State
Smoking ban –0.061 –0.257 –0.713
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.112)∗∗ (0.312)∗∗
Years of education –0.013 –0.011 0.010
(0.001)∗∗∗ (0.009) (0.026)
Log (income) –0.053 –0.156 –0.271
(0.003)∗∗∗ (0.039)∗∗∗ (0.082)∗∗∗
N 64,660 243 51
R2   0.05   0.26   0.59
Notes: Data are from CPS June 2001 Tobacco Supplement Survey. Sample composition is 
respondents eighteen years and older. Regressions weighted by self-  response supplement 
weight. Regressions include controls for age, gender, employed, indoor worker, and a dummy 
for missing income. For years of education, ﬁ  rst, second, third, and fourth grades were aver-
aged to 2.5 years. Fifth and sixth grades were averaged to 5.5 years, seventh and eighth grades 
were averaged to 7.5 years, high school diploma and GEDs were treated as 12 years, some 
college and associates degrees were treated as 14 years, bachelors degrees were treated as 16 
years, masters degrees were treated as 18 years, professional degrees (such as MD’s, DD’s) 
were treated as 20 years, and doctorate degrees (such as PhD’s or EdD’s) were treated as 21 
years. For income,   $5,000 was coded as $2,500, and   $75,000 was coded as $75,000. All 
other categories were averaged over the range in the choice.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.Social Interactions and Smoking    1 3 7
5.6      The Smoking Time Series
In the previous two sections, we focused on cross-  sectional implications 
of social interactions. In this section, we turn to the dynamic implications 
of social interaction models and their connection with the time series of 
cigarette consumption. The basic structure of dynamic social interactions 
models is to assume that the rate at which individuals choose a behavior is 
an increasing function of the share of the population that is already select-
ing that behavior.
For example, if the population was ﬁ  xed and inﬁ  nitely lived, and if people 
who started smoking never stopped, then a dynamic social interaction model 
might take the form:
(2)  S(t   1)   S(t)   (a0   a1S(t))(1   S(t)),
where S(t) is the share of the population that smokes at time t and a0 and a1 
are parameters. In this framework, all nonsmokers have some probability 
of switching to become smokers (a0) and this probability increases with the 
share of the population that is already smoking. The parameter a1 deter-
mines the power of the social interactions.
In this formulation, higher values of S(t) are associated with a more 
S- shaped curve, and it is this S- shaped curve that is the hallmark of dynamic 
social interaction models. For example, ﬁ  gure 5.1 shows the time paths 
implied by three diﬀerent values of a1. In all three cases, we assume that 
S(0)   .05, and a0   .02. We show results for a1   .1, a1   .2 and a1   .3. 
Table 5.6  Spillover eﬀects by education
Impact of smoking ban
Education group   Individual   MSA   State
  High school –0.028 0.075 –0.859
(0.025) (0.202) (0.469)
High school grad –0.059 –0.223 –1.303
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.129)∗ (0.423)∗∗∗
Some college –0.081 –0.426 –0.573
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.123)∗∗∗ (0.320)
College grad –0.027 –0.075 –0.347
    (0.011)∗∗   (0.079)   (0.187)
Notes: Data are from CPS June 2001 Tobacco Supplement Survey. The sample is individuals 
aged eighteen and older. Regressions are weighted and control for age, gender, employed, and 
indoor working.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.138        David M. Cutler and Edward L. Glaeser
Higher values of a1 imply both a faster convergence to everyone smoking 
and also a more s- shaped  curve.
While this one-  sided model might be appropriate for a time period when 
smoking was rising—the ﬁ  rst half of the century, for example—it seems 
ill- suited for the last forty years, when cigarette smoking has been declining. 
A more sensible model might assume that both smokers and nonsmok-
ers have a probability of transitioning into the other group. For example, 
we might assume that a nonsmoker becomes a smoker between time t and 
t   1 with probability a0   a1S(t), and a smoker becomes a nonsmoker 
between time t and time t   1 with probability b0   b1(1 –   S(t)). In this for-
mulation, both the constant transition probabilities and the social impacts 
of smoking may diﬀer. A particularly natural assumption might be that a1   
b1 so that the social impacts of smoking and nonsmoking are identical, but 
that the basic transition probabilities (a0 and b0) diﬀer. We think of changes 
in beliefs about the health consequences of smoking as reﬂ  ecting changes 
in those parameters.
With these assumptions, the new diﬀerence equation characterizing smok-
ing rates is:
(3)  S(t   1)   S(t)   (a0   a1S(t))(1   S(t))   (b0   b1(1   S(t)))S(t).
The change in smoking includes nonsmokers who become smokers (the 
ﬁ  rst term on the right-  hand side) and smokers who become nonsmokers 
(the second term on the right-  hand side). This equation can be rewritten: 
Fig. 5.1    Simulated smoking rate with initiation onlySocial Interactions and Smoking    1 3 9
S(t   1)–  S(t)   a0   (a1 –   a0     b0 –   b1)S(t)   (b1 –   a1)S(t)2. In the case that 
social interactions are the same for smoking and nonsmoking (a1   b1), this 
equation reduces to:
(4)  S(t   1)   S(t)   a0   (a0   b0)S(t).
In this case, the system will converge to a steady-  state S    a0/ (a0   b0). 
Figure 5.2 shows two cases where the impact of social interactions on both 
transitions is the same.3 In the ﬁ  rst case, S(t) converges to the steady-  state 
level from below (starting at a smoking rate of 5 percent), and in the second 
case it converges from above (starting at a rate of 95 percent).
Our modest empirical implementation of this is to regress changes in the 
smoking rates since 1965 on the initial share of the population that smokes 
and the square of that share. We use data from 1965 because that is when 
data on adult prevalence are ﬁ  rst available from the National Health Inter-
view Survey (NHIS). Not all years of the NHIS asked about smoking; we 
use data from all the years that do, and consider adjacent years of the data. 
When we estimate this equation, we ﬁ  nd:
(5)   Rate   2.88   .23   Lagged Rate   .004   Lagged Rate2.
 (5.57)  (.38) (.56)
Fig. 5.2    Simulated smoking rate with quitting and initiation
3. We assume a0   .02 and b0   .04, so that the steady-  state smoking rate is 33 percent.140        David M. Cutler and Edward L. Glaeser
Standard errors are in parentheses. There are eighteen observations and 
the r-  squared is essentially zero (2 percent). Changes in the smoking rate 
over the past twenty-  ﬁ  ve years are uncorrelated with the initial level. This 
seems to suggest that social interactions operate weakly at an aggregate level, 
though clearly the number of observations makes us cautious of drawing 
strong conclusions.
5.7    Conclusion
This chapter discusses the possible reasons why the decision to smoke 
might depend on the smoking decisions of one’s peers, and the empirical 
implications of social interactions in smoking. The most obvious implica-
tion is that exogenous forces that make one person’s smoking less likely will 
decrease the probability that a peer will also smoke. Other implications are 
that social interactions will create high levels of variance across aggregates, 
and that there will be social multipliers, where exogenous attributes matter 
more at higher levels of aggregation.
We found that individuals whose spouse faced a workplace smoking ban 
were less likely to smoke themselves. The instrumental variables estimate of 
the impact of spousal smoking suggests a 40 percent reduction in the prob-
ability of being an individual smoking if a spouse quits. These impacts were 
greatest for people with modest levels of education, although not uniformly 
so. The variance in smoking rates across states and metropolitan areas is 
about seven times higher than it would be if there were no social interactions 
and if there were no exogenous variables diﬀering across space. We also ﬁ  nd 
a signiﬁ  cant social multiplier in the impact of smoking bans. The bans have 
a much stronger impact at higher levels of aggregation.
These results suggest that policy interventions that impact an individu-
al’s smoking habit will have both direct eﬀects and also indirect eﬀects 
on the smoking of peers. Workplace bans seem not only to have reduced 
worker smoking but also the smoking of the worker’s spouse. Our results 
also suggest that interventions are likely to have larger impacts when they are 
imposed at higher levels of aggregation, although we found little evidence 
suggesting that social interactions can explain the shape of the time series 
of smoking rates.
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Comment  Arie Kapteyn
It is gratifying to see that economics is catching up quickly with other social 
sciences (particularly sociology and social psychology) by incorporating 
social interactions into models of behavior. One contribution economics 
may make is to bring rigor to the ﬁ  eld and to characterize in particular what 
is and what is not identiﬁ  able in the models that we consider (as in Manski 
[1993]). Smoking is clearly an example where we would expect social inter-
actions to be important, but also one where social interactions are hard to 
distinguish from other reasons for observing clusters of smokers or non-
smokers. The most obvious problem is that smokers (or nonsmokers) may 
ﬂ  ock together. So if we see that smokers often have friends or spouses who 
smoke, this may point to social interactions, but it may also simply indicate 
correlated preferences.
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